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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
James Barton pleaded guilty to two counts of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  In doing so, he reserved the right to 
argue on appeal that these convictions violate his Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.  Because we hold that 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional both on its face and as 
applied to Barton, we will affirm. 
 
I 
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 On April 20, 2007, a confidential police informant paid 
Barton $300 for an Iver Johnson 32-caliber revolver loaded with 
five rounds of ammunition and a box containing 44 rounds of 
ammunition.  The serial number on the firearm had been drilled 
out, rendering it indecipherable.  Based on the information 
provided by the confidential informant, the police obtained a 
warrant to search Barton’s residence.  The search uncovered 
seven pistols, five rifles, three shotguns, and various types of 
ammunition. 
 Barton was indicted on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm and 
ammunition.1  It is undisputed that Barton had prior felony 
convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute 
and for receipt of a stolen firearm.  Barton moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated his 
fundamental right to “use arms in defense of hearth and home,” 
recognized by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), as the “core” principle 
embodied in the Second Amendment.  Id. at 630. 
 The District Court denied Barton’s motion to dismiss, 
relying on the Supreme Court’s statement in Heller that certain 
“longstanding” statutes restricting the Second Amendment right 
to bear arms, such as those prohibiting gun possession by felons, 
                                                 
1 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) states, in relevant part: “It shall 
be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any 
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any 
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce.” 
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are “presumptively lawful.”  See id. at 626-27 n.26.  Finding 
that such dispossession statutes cannot be both “presumptively 
lawful” and facially unconstitutional, the District Court refused 
to read Heller to invalidate this prohibition. 
 Following the District Court’s denial of his motion to 
dismiss, Barton entered conditional guilty pleas to both charges. 
 The District Court sentenced Barton to 51 months in prison, 
followed by three years of supervised release.  Barton filed this 
timely appeal. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Barton’s 
indictment and sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 
exercise plenary review over Barton’s constitutional challenge.  
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 151 (3d Cir. 2009). 
A 
The Second Amendment provides: “A well-regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. II.  In Heller, the Supreme Court held that 
the Second Amendment confers an individual the right to keep 
and bear arms that is not conditioned on service in a militia.  554 
U.S. at 595.  At the “core” of the Second Amendment is the 
right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense 
of hearth and home.”  Id. at 635 (holding that a District of 
Columbia ordinance, which created an “absolute prohibition of 
handguns held and used for self-defense in the home,” could not 
withstand any level of “scrutiny that [the Court] has applied to 
enumerated Constitutional rights”).  See also McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010) (“right to keep and 
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bear arms [is] among those fundamental rights necessary to our 
system of ordered liberty”). 
Although the individual right to keep and bear arms is 
fundamental, it is “not unlimited,” id. at 676, and certain 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms” are 
“presumptively lawful,”  id. at 626-27 n.26.  These include: 
“prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings, [and] laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.”  Id. at 626-27.  As reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, this list of “presumptively 
lawful” regulations reflects the historical understanding “from 
Blackstone through the 19th-century cases . . . that the [right 
protected in the Second Amendment] was not a right to keep 
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever purpose.”  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.  
Accordingly, Heller’s list of permissible regulations “does not 
purport to be exhaustive.”  Id. at 627 n.26. 
Barton argues that the Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
presumptive lawfulness of felon gun dispossession statutes is 
mere dicta, as it “could have been deleted without seriously 
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding—that, being 
peripheral, may not have received the full and careful 
consideration of the court that uttered it.”  McDonald v. Master 
Fin. Inc., 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sarnoff v. 
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 This argument is not without force, as three of our sister courts 
of appeals have characterized the “presumptively lawful” 
language in Heller as dicta.  See United States v. Scroggins, 
599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. McCane, 
573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., 
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concurring); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc).  Even so, these courts relied on the Heller 
“dicta” to reaffirm the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).  See 
Skoein, 614 F.3d at 639; Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 451; McCane, 
573 F.3d at 1047.  Moreover, two circuit courts of appeals have 
recognized that “[t]o the extent that this portion of Heller limits 
the Court’s opinion to possession of firearms by law-abiding and 
qualified individuals, it is not dicta.”  United States v. Rozier, 
598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010); see also United States 
v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Courts often 
limit the scope of their holdings, and such limitations are integral 
to those holdings.”). 
We agree with the Second and Ninth Circuits that 
Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful” regulations is not dicta.  
As we understand Heller, its instruction to the District of 
Columbia to “permit [Heller] to register his handgun [and to] 
issue him a license to carry it in the home,” was not 
unconditional.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 647.  Rather, it was 
made expressly contingent upon a determination that Heller was 
not “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment 
rights.”  Id.  The District of Columbia could comply with the 
Supreme Court’s holding either: (1) by finding that Heller was 
“disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights” 
under a “presumptively lawful” regulation (such as a felon 
dispossession statute); or (2) by registering Heller’s handgun 
and allowing him to keep it operable in his home.  Id.  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Heller of the 
categorical exceptions to the Second Amendment was not 
abstract and hypothetical; it was outcome-determinative.  As 
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such, we are bound by it.  See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 
1, 30 (1991).2 
B 
To prevail on his facial challenge, Barton must 
“establish[] that no set of circumstances exists under which . . . 
[§ 922(g)(1)] would be valid, i.e., that the law is 
unconstitutional in all of its applications.”  Wash. State Grange 
v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) 
(internal citations and quotations marks omitted).3  The 
                                                 
2 Barton cites two opinions—an unpublished Fourth 
Circuit opinion and a vacated Seventh Circuit opinion—for the 
proposition that courts may not rely exclusively on Heller’s list 
of “presumptively lawful” regulations to justify categorical 
exclusions to the Second Amendment.  See United States v. 
Chester, 367 F. App’x 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 614 
F.3d 638 (2010).  Barton’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. 
 The statute at issue in Chester and Skoein—a prohibition on 
gun possession by misdemeanor domestic violence offenders—
was not included in Heller’s list of permissible regulations.  See 
Chester, 367 F. App’x at 393; Skoien, 587 F.3d at 804.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, these courts were forced to look beyond 
the language in Heller to find that domestic violence offenders 
were not protected by the Second Amendment.  Here, no such 
inquiry is necessary, because § 922(g)(1) is one of Heller’s 
enumerated exceptions. 
3 Because we do not recognize an “overbreadth” 
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984), Barton cannot 
raise a successful facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) by simply 
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Supreme Court has twice stated that felon gun dispossession 
statutes are “presumptively lawful.”  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 
626-27 n.26; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.  A “lawful” 
prohibition regulates conduct “fall[ing outside] the scope of the 
Second Amendment’s guarantee.”  See United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding this 
interpretation a “better reading, based on the text and structure 
of Heller,” than one that would require “lawful” regulations to 
satisfy every level of constitutional scrutiny).4 
In sum, because Heller requires that we “presume,” 
under most circumstances, that felon dispossession statutes 
regulate conduct which is unprotected by the Second 
Amendment, Barton’s facial challenge must fail.  Accord 
Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770-71; Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1114-18; 
McCane, 573 F.3d at 1047; United States v. Anderson, 559 
                                                                                                             
showing that the statute operates unconstitutionally under some 
sets of circumstances. 
4 In Marzzarella, we faced a “novel” regulation—namely, 
a ban on the possession of a firearm with a “removed, 
obliterated, or altered” serial number.  614 F.3d at 93.  Unlike 
the “presumptively lawful” prohibitions listed in Heller, 18 
U.S.C. § 922(k) was neither “derived from historical 
regulations,” id., nor addressed conduct “with a heightened 
capability to cause damage,” id. at 95.  Accordingly, we could 
not determine with certainty whether the act of owning an 
unmarked weapon fell within or outside the Second 
Amendment’s protections.  Id.  We nevertheless upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute, finding, under the second step of 
Heller’s two-part inquiry, that 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) satisfies both 
intermediate and strict scrutiny.  Id. at 101. 
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F.3d 348, 352 & n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2814 
(2009). 
C 
Having rejected Barton’s facial challenge, we turn to his 
claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to 
him.  As the Government concedes, Heller’s statement 
regarding the presumptive validity of felon gun dispossession 
statutes does not foreclose Barton’s as-applied challenge.  By 
describing the felon disarmament ban as “presumptively” lawful, 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 n.26, the Supreme Court implied 
that the presumption may be rebutted. 
Heller does not catalogue the facts we must consider 
when reviewing a felon’s as-applied challenge.  Rather, the 
Supreme Court has noted that it will “expound upon the 
historical justifications for exceptions [it] mentioned if and when 
those exceptions come before [it].”  Id. at 635.  Thus, to 
evaluate Barton’s as-applied challenge, we look to the historical 
pedigree of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) to determine whether the 
traditional justifications underlying the statute support a finding 
of permanent disability in this case. 
The first federal statute disqualifying felons from 
possessing firearms was enacted in 1938.  Federal Firearms Act 
(FFA), ch. 850, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938).  In enacting 
the statute, “Congress sought to rule broadly -- to keep guns out 
of the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not 
be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to 
society.”  Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 
(1977) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Although 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) was meant to “keep 
firearms out of the hands of presumptively ‘risky people,’” 
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United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 345 (1971), Congress did 
not bar non-violent felons from possessing guns until 1961.  See 
An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-
342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961).  For nearly a quarter century, § 
922(g)(1) had a “narrower basis for a disability, limited to those 
convicted of a ‘crime of violence.’”  Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t 
Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
695, 698 (2009).  “Crimes of violence” were commonly 
understood to include only those offenses “ordinarily committed 
with the aid of firearms.”  Id. at 702.  Prior to 1923, at least 
seven state legislatures had adopted bans on the carrying of 
concealed weapons by violent offenders.  Id. at 702, 707-09 
(citing HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 862-63 (1925)); see also 
State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 574-75 (Ohio 1900) (holding that 
a state law banning “tramps,” or roaming beggars, from 
carrying firearms protected “every honest man, woman and 
child” from the threat of theft, robbery, and murder). 
Debates from the Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire ratifying conventions, which were considered 
“highly influential” by the Supreme Court in Heller, 554 U.S. at 
604, also confirm that the common law right to keep and bear 
arms did not extend to those who were likely to commit violent 
offenses.  For instance, when Anti-Federalist delegates at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention proposed in December 1787 
that the Constitution include a right to keep and bear arms, they 
excluded from this right those who had committed crimes and 
those who posed a “real . . . danger of public injury.”  BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
665 (1971).  And as Samuel Adams urged at the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention, the Second Amendment should “be never 
construed . . . to prevent the people of the United States who are 
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peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms.”  Id. at 674-
75 (emphasis added); see also id. at 674-75 (describing a 
proposal at the New Hampshire ratifying convention, which 
would have ensured that Congress “never disarm any Citizen 
unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion”); Robert E. 
Shallope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 130 (1986) (citing Seventeenth Century 
English sources for the proposition that arms should only be 
placed in the hands of those interested in preserving the “publick 
Peace”). 
To raise a successful as-applied challenge, Barton must 
present facts about himself and his background that distinguish 
his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from 
Second Amendment protections.  For instance, a felon 
convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might show that he is no 
more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.  Similarly, a 
court might find that a felon whose crime of conviction is 
decades-old poses no continuing threat to society.  The North 
Carolina Supreme Court did just that in Britt v. State, 681 
S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009), finding that a felon convicted in 1979 
of one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute had a constitutional right to keep and bear arms, at 
least as that right is understood under the North Carolina 
Constitution.  Id. at 323. 
Unlike the defendant in Britt, Barton fails to develop the 
factual basis for his as-applied challenge.  Barton does not argue 
that his predicate offenses make him no more likely than the 
typical citizen to commit a crime of violence, nor could he have 
done so persuasively in light of the facts of his case.  Courts 
have held in a number of contexts that offenses relating to drug 
trafficking and receiving stolen weapons are closely related to 
violent crime.  See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 
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1490 (5th Cir. 1995) (“We have observed repeatedly that 
firearms are the tools of the trade of those involved in illegal 
drug activity.”); United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 454 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (“The Commission promulgated U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1(b)(2) on the premise that ‘stolen firearms are used 
disproportionately in the commission of crimes.’”) (citing 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2), commentary).  Moreover, the record 
indicates that Barton has not been rehabilitated, as he recently 
admitted to selling a firearm with an obliterated serial number to 
a confidential police informant.  Because Barton has failed to 
demonstrate that his circumstances place him outside the 
intended scope of § 922(g)(1), we find no error in the District 
Court’s dismissal of his as-applied challenge. 
As a fallback position, Barton maintains that even if his 
prior offenses place him in a category of offenders society has 
decided should “not be trusted to possess a firearm,” 
Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 572, the government may not strip 
him of his fundamental right to use a weapon for the purpose of 
defending “hearth and home.”  In support of this argument, 
Barton cites the Supreme Court’s statement in Heller that the 
right to use a weapon in self-defense is at the “core” of one’s 
right to keep and bear arms.  554 U.S. at 570.  Barton contends 
that § 922(g)(1), like the ordinance struck down in Heller, is 
unconstitutional to the extent that it restricts his fundamental 
right to keep a weapon in his home for self-defense.  See id. 
 Barton’s argument regarding defense of his home is 
foreclosed by our decision in  Marzzarella.  There, we 
recognized that a “felon arguably possesses just as strong an 
interest in defending himself and his home as any law-abiding 
individual.”  614 F.3d at 92.  Nevertheless, we held that “a 
felony conviction disqualifies an individual from asserting” his 
fundamental right to “defense of hearth and home.”  Id.  In this 
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regard, the Second Amendment is not unique; felony 
convictions trigger a number of disabilities, many of which 
impact fundamental constitutional rights.  See, e.g., McKune v. 
Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 38 (2002) (“[L]awful conviction and 
incarceration necessarily place limitations on the exercise of a 
defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.”); Jones v. 
Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 419 (1981) (upholding restrictions on a 
felon’s fundamental right to travel); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 
U.S. 24, 54-56 (1974) (upholding a state law disenfranchising 
felons on the basis of criminal conviction); see also D.C. CODE 
§ 49-401 (prohibiting felons from serving in a militia). 
 The federal felon gun dispossession statute, like the 
disabilities noted above, does not depend on how or for what 
reason the right is exercised.  Rather, it focuses upon whom the 
right was intended to protect.  The language in Heller makes 
this clear: the opinion does not refer to “regulations” on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, but rather 
to “prohibitions.”  554 U.S. at 626.  A “prohibition” does more 
than merely alter or restrain a person’s behavior; it is “an edict, 
decree, or order which forbids, prevents, or excludes.”  
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).  Moreover, the 
prohibition discussed in Heller is a broad one: a person may 
“possess” any item over which he exercises “dominion and 
control.”  United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 883 
(3d Cir. 1991)).  Thus, Heller forecloses any as-applied 
challenge based on the manner in which a felon wishes to 
exercise his Second Amendment rights. 
Despite the breadth of this exclusion, denying felons the 
right to possess firearms is entirely consistent with the purpose 
of the Second Amendment to maintain “the security of a free 
State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. II.  It is well-established that felons 
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are more likely to commit violent crimes than are other law-
abiding citizens.  See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 at 6 (2002) (finding 
that within a population of 234,358 federal inmates released in 
1994, the rates of arrest for homicides were 53 times the 
national average).  Moreover, felons forfeit other civil liberties, 
including fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to 
vote or to serve on a jury.  For these reasons, we find persuasive 
the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that “felons are categorically 
different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to 
bear arms.”  Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115. 
III 
 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald 
compel the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is facially 
constitutional.  It is also constitutional as applied to Barton 
because he has presented no facts distinguishing his 
circumstances from those of other felons who are categorically 
unprotected by the Second Amendment.  For these reasons, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction and 
sentence. 
